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This paper presents a method to make measurable what was not: the 
discourses of politicians regarding decentralization. For this purpose, 
we develop a “matrix of arguments” and a set of indexes, and apply 
them to provide a snapshot of the politicians’ views on the “General 














Decentralization is an active process around the world. Developing countries are using 
decentralization as a “possible way of escaping from the traps of ineffective and inefficient 
governance,  macroeconomic  instability,  and  inadequate  economic  growth”  (Bird  and 
Vaillancourt, 2000, page 1). Countries in transition in Eastern and Central Europe are also 
trying to catch up by applying decentralization processes (Stewart, 2000). Developed countries 
are seeking, through decentralization, to pay more attention to the requirements of the new 
“post-welfare state” (Wildasin, 1997). In this context, and as we will explain below, Spain 
provides a striking example, as lower levels of government are dealing with an increased 
percentage of income and spending, while the central government is partly losing its power. 
Taking  for  granted  that  the  decentralization  process  is  already  working  in  practice  (the 
“outside” of the topic), it is interesting to know how the Parliament is dealing with the process 
(the “inside” of the topic).
We present here what is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to study the practical 
aspects  of  decentralization  based  on  the  discourses  of  politicians.  At  its  most  basic,  the 
method first identifies all the arguments that politicians can use in favor or against a law, and 
then classifies them as “centralized” or “decentralized” arguments. The information compiled 
in the matrix so constructed is then translated into a set of indexes that characterizes the 
position of the different parties and the theoretical arguments used in the discussions.
We  then  consider  an  application  of  the  methodology.  The  paper  tackles 
decentralization  in  Spain  in  a  novel  way,  trying  to  observe  whether  and  how  politicians 
support this issue in their debates. From 1984, the first year of real decentralization
1, to the 
present, Parliament (Congress and Senate) has held many debates concerning the transfer of 
power from central to lower levels of government. We will focus our analysis on the debates 
with respect to the new “General Law of Budgetary Stability” (henceforward GLBS)
2, which was sanctioned in December 2001. We are performing a partial analysis of political debate, 
since we will focus the study on issues related only to decentralization, keeping away from 
other issues such as the debates about the need for fiscal discipline in itself. However, we will 
offer an estimation of the political position of each political party regarding decentralization.  
From  January  2003
3  the  GLBS  required  all  levels  of  government  (Central, 
Autonomous Communities (henceforward A.C.) and Local Corporations (henceforward L.C.)) 
to balance their respective budgets, equalizing spending and income. Budgetary stability for 
lower levels of government is a mandate coming from the central level. In this sense, it is not 
obvious how the GLBS is supporting decentralization. 
The next two sections will offer, respectively, a closer look at how decentralization has 
worked  so  far  in  Spain,  as  well  as  some  background  information  about  the  GLBS.  The 
methodology is discussed in section four, where two main tools are introduced: the “matrix of 
decentralization”  and  the  “index  of  decentralization”.  The  matrix  offers  a  wide  set  of 
theoretical arguments -grouped by families- that politicians could use in their debates. The 
index offers a snapshot of the level of support for decentralization. In section five, we present 
an application of our methodology, considering the case of the Spanish GLBS. Section six 
provides a wider overview of the method, considering its strengths and weaknesses. Section 
seven concludes.
2. THE DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS IN SPAIN
Decentralization, a process that started in 1978, is still ongoing in Spain. In this short 
period of time,  the country has rapidly converged in  terms of decentralization with other 
countries with more federalist traditions, like Germany or Switzerland. We do not offer here a 
detailed explanation about how decentralization has taken place in Spain; rather, we simply provide some general references and a brief description of the Spanish case and compare it 
with the theory of decentralization. Interesting reviews of how decentralization has worked in 
practice can be found in Fossati and Panella (1999), who provide a good comparison among 
the  different  evolutions  of  decentralization  in  some  European  countries.  Suárez-Pandiello 
(1999), Braña Pino and Serna de los Mozos (1999) and Molero (2001, 2002) provide recent 
surveys of the Spanish case.
One of the most important landmarks offering a model of how to decentralize is the 
“theory of fiscal federalism” (Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959), Olson  (1969), and Oates 
(1972)). Even if this model has not been strictly applied in practice, it is the only serious 
archetype offering a theoretical approach to the issue. In Spain, decentralization has barely 
followed the fiscal federalism theory.
With respect to the evolution of the decentralization process in Spain, and taking into 
account both sides of the Public Administration budget (spending and income), we can see 
that from 1984 to the present, decentralization has happened mostly on the side of spending. It 
was  only  in  2001  that,  with  the  approval  of  a  new  financing  law  for  lower  levels  of 
government, A.C. started to manage a larger share of their own income. 
According  to  available  data  on  consolidated  total  spending  for  all  Public 
Administrations
4  in  Spain,  the  central  government  has  lost  a  great  deal  of  control  over 
spending over the last twenty years (72.6 percent of total expenditure was carried out by the 
central government in 1984, a figure that had gone down to 51.1 percent by 2005). Much of 
this expenditure is now in the hands of A.C., the real “winners” of the decentralization process 
(in particular, those with “high level of competencies”). In fact, the percentage of expenditure 
by A.C. more than doubled in this period, going from 14.4 percent to 33.1 percent in 2005. Two notes are in order. First, this decentralization on the side of expenditure has not 
been coupled with decentralization on income-generation, which was still mostly in the hands 
of  the  central  government.  Second,  if  A.C.  have  been  the  “winners”,  the  “losers”  of  the 
decentralization process have been the L.C. Their spending went only from 13.0 percent of the 
consolidated total expenditure in 1984 to 15.8 percent in 2005. We could say that L.C. are still 
waiting for a second decentralization process coming from the A.C.
As a conclusion, and despite the different problems and shortcomings of the process, 
we have to remark that the decentralization of public expenditure has been one the major 
events in Spain during recent years. Moreover, it has helped Spain to establish a democratic 
spirit and move away from the previous centralized phase. 
3. THE “GENERAL LAW OF BUDGETARY STABILITY” (GLBS)
The  European  Union  is  concerned  about  fiscal  discipline.  For  this  reason,  the 
“Stability  and  Growth  Pact”  (henceforward  SGP)  was  approved  in  July  1997  to  balance 
spending and income. To apply the SGP, Spain developed its own “Stability Program 1998-
2002” at the end of the year 1998, to be updated yearly. The objective of this program was to 
reduce deficit and debt and to ensure economic growth. 
Trying to reinforce the compliance with the principles of the SGP, the political party 
running the  central government in  Spain  during those years, Partido  Popular, decided to 
present in  the Parliament the project of a “General Law of Budgetary Stability” (GLBS), 
together with a “Complementary Law” in order to apply the GLBS at the level of Autonomous 
Communities according to their own legislation
5. The discussions at the Parliament took place 
from February 2 (when the law was presented by the government) to November of 2001, and 
the general law and its complementary one were approved on December 12, 2001. The key principles of the GLBS are described in Annex 1. A detailed analysis of the 
law is outside the scope of this paper, and readers are referred to González-Páramo (2001) for 
an in-depth study of the law.
4. THE METHODOLOGY
Political  discourses  are  often  convoluted,  and  the  interventions  dealing  with  a 
particular  issue  may  be  scattered,  difficult  to  locate  and  costly  to  relate  to  the  academic 
literature. Up to now, very little effort has been put in trying to study the possible useful 
information one could obtain from the Parliamentary discourses by the politicians. We present 
a new method trying to make measurable what was not so (the discourses in Parliament) 
through a novel compilation of politicians’ speeches.
To our knowledge, nobody in the literature has so far attempted to study political 
discourses on decentralization and systematically join the analysis with the theory of fiscal 
federalism  and  its  application.  Not  even  work  that  considers  political  discourses  is  in 
abundance  (with  the  exceptions  of:  Bel  and  Costas,  2001;  Bel,  2003;  Steiner,  Bächtiger, 
Spörndli, and Steenbergen, 2003, 2005), and there is very limited contribution on studying 
discourses through categorization of arguments (Pujol, 1998, 2008; and Molero, 2003).
We will now present the main elements required to elaborate a matrix for the study of 
decentralization laws and discuss each of the necessary steps in turn. 
4.1. ELABORATING THE “MATRIX OF DECENTRALIZATION”
The first step is the compilation of the discourses. When applying the method to any 
particular instance, the review of the relevant sources needs to be comprehensive and tailored to each case under study. Special care may be needed if the discussion takes place in different 
legislative sessions or across various levels of government.
Once the compilation is completed, we divide the pages of the relevant documents -
which contain the transcripts of the debates - in “units of extension”. We give one point of 
extension, or fraction in five-decimal increments, to each column (two columns per page) and 
to each amendment proposal.
The identification of the arguments of the matrix is the crucial and original part of the 
methodology. From the study of the literature on the issue, we identify the relevant theoretical 
principles dealing with the matter at hand. After the theoretical arguments are identified, the 
matrix is constructed, classifying each argument as “centralized” or “decentralized”. 
The second step addresses the grouping of the individual arguments in families. With 
the term “family” we characterize groups of arguments that arise from the same theoretical 
principle. With this it becomes possible to study the discourses from the general point of view 
of  theoretical  principles.  The  appurtenance  of  the  specific  arguments  appears  to  be  clear 
enough for all cases. However, the possible misclassification of one argument would not have 
a strong effect on the general methodology because the difference between centralized and 
decentralized arguments is clear-cut.
In practical terms, for the identification of the arguments we have taken into account 
the prescriptions of the “fiscal federalism theory” concerning decentralization. The matrix 
(presented in Table 1) contains self-explanatory descriptions of the arguments. All of them 
come from key works of the literature, such as Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), Boadway 
and Shah (1995), Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996), Oates (1999), and Olson (1969). 
Since the second part of this paper is the application of our methodology to a specific 
case (the GLBS), we complemented the “basic” theoretical principles with the revision of specific  research,  as  compiled  in  Braña Pino  and  Serna  de  los  Mozos  (1999),  González-
Páramo (2001), Melguizo Sánchez (1989), and Molero (2001, 2002). 
As a result, we obtain the matrix of decentralization, which contains 34 arguments 
that  may  be  potentially  used  by  the  politicians.  We  classify  arguments  as  “supporting 
centralization” (or ‘c’ arguments, shown in the first column) or “supporting decentralization” 
(referred to as ‘d’ arguments, and presented in the second column). Individual arguments are 
further classified into one of the seven following families:
Family  A.  Budgetary  and  financing  autonomy:  how  can  the  different  levels  of 
government best deal with deficits, and what implications does budgetary 
stability have for each tier.
Family  B.  Income  redistribution  and  spending  on  social  issues:  how  are 
redistribution  and  social  spending  affected  by  the  decentralization  of 
responsibilities. 
Family C. Macroeconomic stabilization: which level of government is best suited to 
attain macroeconomic stabilization, and how is it affected by budgetary 
discipline mandated at the national level.
Family D. Public Choice: who should impose stability, and how are the benefits 
distributed for citizens and the different levels of government.
Family  E.  Legislation:  what are the implications  of the legal background for the 
distribution of responsibilities in budgetary stability.
Family F. Spending on economic services: basic guiding principles for the allocation 
of responsibilities on economic services across levels of government. 
Family  G.  General  expenditures:  basic  guiding  principles  for  the  allocation  of 
responsibilities on general services across levels of government.[Table 1 about here]
Once the theoretical arguments are identified and classified in categories, we can start 
filling in the matrix by reading the relevant discourses. Every time an argument is identified, a 
reference (one point) is included in the appropriate cell. This will provide a general view of 
the politicians’ positions on the matter at hand. We can also use this information to calculate a 
numerical index of political commitment for decentralization, or “index of decentralization”, 
as described in the next section.
4.2. THE “INDEX OF DECENTRALIZATION”
To study the position of a political party on a particular issue (in the application we 
use later, this would be the GLBS), we “run” the party’s discourses through the filter of the 
matrix. Each time an argument is identified in the speech of a politician we assign one point to 
his  political  party  in  the appropriate cell of the matrix.  Sometimes,  politicians  were only 
partially close to a theoretical argument; in these cases we have assigned just half a point to 
their interventions. 
Next, we summarize all the different arguments (“decentralized” and “centralized” 
arguments) identified for each political party and construct an index. The index is presented in 
a scale ranging from +10 (all the interventions are in support of decentralization) to -10 (all 
the interventions are in support of centralization). Thus, the “index of decentralization” - ID 
(P) - is calculated according to [1]. 
Index, by political party:
          G               G                 G
ID (P) = [(∑ adi - ∑ aci) / (∑ ta)]*10                              [1]
        i=A            i=A              i=AID (P) = index, by political party.
P= political parties: BNG, CC, CHA, etc.
ad = number of arguments supporting decentralization.
ac = number of arguments supporting centralization.
ta = total number of arguments.
A through G = the different families of arguments that could be used.
The  index  gives  us  an  idea  of  the  overall  nature  of  the  politicians’  speeches, 
independent  of  how  frequent  their  interventions  are.  Positive  numbers  indicate  the  party 
supports  decentralization (higher numbers mean stronger support for decentralization) and 
negative numbers represent the contrary position. A score of zero would indicate an equal 
number of arguments for and against decentralization.
At the same time, the index calculates the average position of each party by taking 
the average of all relevant interventions, solving the potential problem of dissension within 
political groups.
We  can  extend  the  analysis  to  more  particular  issues  if  politicians  use  in  their 
interventions a variety of arguments. In the particular case used here, politicians make use of 
enough families to allow us to conduct this type of analysis at the family level. The index of 
decentralization would then be calculated as indicated in [2], and it would provide a measure 
of the intensity of each type of argument.
Index, by family of arguments:
ID (F) = [(∑ ad   -   ∑ ac) / (∑ ta)]*10                         [2]
ID (F) = index, by family of arguments, across all political parties. 
F= families of arguments: A, B, C, D, E, F, and G.
ad = number of arguments supporting decentralization.
ac = number of arguments supporting centralization.
ta = total number of arguments.Considering the results of the index as calculated in [1] and [2] allows us to compare 
the particular strategies of the different political parties and the politicians’ overall positioning 
with respect to the different aspects of the law.
5. THE APPLICATION
5.1. THE ANALYSIS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSES
Spain  is  a  Parliamentary  Monarchy,  with  a  system  of  two  Chambers,  las  Cortes 
Generales or Parlamento (Parliament), formed by a Congress and a Senate. The discourses of 
the GLBS took place in both Chambers, and we used the official transcription of the debates, 
that is, the Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales  (henceforward BOCG), as source. The 
individual documents used are listed in Annex 2.
The political parties discussing the GLBS were the following. The Partido Popular  
(PP), a center-right party, was running the central government during the discussions of the 
GLBS. PP won the elections in 2000 (for the period 2000-2004), obtaining more than 50 
percent of the seats in Parliament, and it was running the central government without needing 
support from other parties. The main Parliamentary opposition was the Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español (PSOE), a center-left party. One other political party at national level was 
Izquierda Unida (IU), a federation of left parties including, most notably, the Communist 
Party.  The  rest  of  the  parties  have  regional  bases:  Coalición  Canaria  (CC)  from  Canary 
Islands; Convergència i Unió  (CIU), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), Iniciativa 
per Catalunya-Els Verds (IC-V), and  Entesa Catalana de Progrés (ECP) from Catalonia; 
Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) from Galice; Chunta Aragonista (CHA) from Aragon; 
Partido  Andalucista  (PAN)  from  Andalucia;  and  Eusko  Alkartasuna  (EA),  Partido 
Nacionalista  Vasco  (PNV),  and  the  senators  from  the  Basque  Country:  Senadores Nacionalistas  Vasco  (SNV).  We  included  separately  the  interventions  of  the  Minister  of 
Finance  –of  PP  affiliation-  (Min.Fin.).  All  in  all,  there  are  14  political  parties  (or 
parliamentary groups) plus the Minister of Finance discussing the GLBS
6.
We must note that we present here the results aggregated at the party level. It would 
also  be  possible  to  do  it  for  each  politician  involved  in  the  debate.  This  may  be  more 
appropriate in systems where divisions are not necessarily drawn along party lines, but may be 
according to place of origin or other criteria. In the example we use (the Spanish case), party 
discipline is the rule, and very rarely do politicians express an opinion other than the party’s. 
The Minister of Finance is the only one breaking party discipline, so we consider it both 
separately and in conjunction with its political party PP. 
The total extension of the discourses analyzed is approximately 500 pages of BOCG, 
and we have registered 149 interventions by different politicians. Table 2 shows the units of 
extension for the 14 political parties and the Minister of Finance. The extension of the 13 
documents analyzed in this research is 667.75 units
7. BNG is the political party with the most 
extension (more time speaking in both Chambers -Congress and Senate-) for its discourses: 
103.7 units over 667.75 (15.52% of the total units). Following BNG, we find IU (92.2 units), 
PP (74.7 units, 102.85 counting together the extension of the Minister of Finance - 28.15 units 
-), CIU (65.7 units) and PSOE (64.6 units). 
[Table 2 about here]
From Table 2 we can also provide another piece of key information: the number of 
arguments from the “matrix of decentralization” identified in the discourse of each political 
party. A first result to note is that the matrix seems to capture a large number of arguments in 
the politicians’ discourses: From the 13 documents analyzed (667.75 units of extension) we 
identify 732 arguments of the “matrix of decentralization”
8. Most of the arguments have been 
identified in the discourses of the political party PP (92 arguments, 141 including those of the Minister of Finance) and by PNV (95.5 arguments). In order of importance, we mention: IU 
(74.5 arguments), PSOE (69 arguments), SNV (65.5 arguments), BNG (56.5 arguments), and 
CIU (55 arguments).
We could propose another measure (the last column in Table 2), which represents the 
degree  of  intensity  of  the  political  discourse  on  decentralization  (number  of  arguments 
identified with respect to the units of extension of the discourse of each political party). This 
measure provides information on which parties are most interested on the subject in relative 
terms. In the example presented here, these are CHA, ERC, IC-V, EA, and also Minister of 
Finance.
5.2. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
After  analyzing  the  interventions  of  the  different  political  parties  regarding  the 
extension of their discourses and knowing how many arguments have been identified for each 
party, our next step goes deeper, identifying the kinds of arguments from congresswomen, 
congressmen  and  senators'  speeches.  Graph  1  below  shows  the  distribution  of  the  732 
arguments by sort of arguments used, and provides a snapshot of the content of the political 
discourse dealing with the Spanish GLBS.
[Graph 1 about here]
Taking a look at Graph 1, we observe that the arguments used more often by all 
political  parties  are  those  favoring decentralization.    Family  A  (“budgetary  and  financing 
autonomy”) is the most frequently utilized by politicians (336 arguments identified). Also 
family E (“legislation”) with 180 arguments identified, and family D (“public choice”) with 
152  arguments,  are  habitually  used  at  the  politicians'  interventions.  Family  B  (“income 
redistribution and spending on social issues”) and family C (“macroeconomic stabilization”) are barely used, regarding neither decentralized arguments nor centralized ones. Politicians 
never use family F (“spending on economic services”) and family G (“general expenditures”). 
The addition of all decentralized arguments (Ad + Bd + Cd + Dd + Ed) is 679 (92.6 percent 
over the total of arguments identified -732- ). Summarizing centralized arguments (Ac + Bc + 
Cc+ Dc + Ec), we can conclude that they are used only 7.4 percent of the times. In this sense, 
one of the first conclusions of our analysis is that when politicians are speaking about the 
GLBS  at  the  Parliament,  they  are  using  decentralized  arguments,  independently  of  their 
position on acceptance of the law. 
During its approval, the GLBS offered a new framework of political debate regarding 
the decentralization process. The new imposition of rules in order to control the budget at 
regional  and  local  levels  could  have  justified  a  greater  number  of  centralized  arguments. 
Nevertheless, the empirical results show that this possible centralized attitude almost does not 
appear. In fact, more than 90 percent of the arguments are useful in order to favor the benefits 
of the decentralization. It is possible that there will be politicians doing that because of their 
real decentralization conviction and others due solely to their political interests. Either way, 
data clearly show that nowadays it is not “politically correct” to defend openly centralization 
in Spain. 
**********
The next step in our research is to link part of the information presented in Table 2 
(the distribution of the 732 arguments by political parties) and Graph 1 (the distribution of the 
732 arguments by families). This matching is included in Table 3 below.
[Table 3 about here]
After reading the different discourses concerning the GLBS, the main remark is, as 
we could expect, that practically all political parties in the opposition (except a few discourses of  CC  and  CIU)  are  against  the  law  (they  argue  that  the  law  tends  to  centralization).  
Furthermore,  they  build  their  discourses  by  saying  that  GLBS  will  unduly  attack  the 
decentralization process and its virtues. As an exception, the political party CC has one B and 
two D centralized arguments defending the law (see Table 3 above). Logically, the political 
party PP (this party presented the law and it was running the central government) was always 
defending  the  law.  Practically  all  centralized  arguments  defending  the  law  have  been 
identified in PP discourses, and they are mostly C and D centralized arguments (see Table 3). 
However, this political party is not only using centralized arguments, but also decentralized 
ones. When most parties support the law they claim it favors decentralization, and vice versa.  
However, PP uses both centralized and decentralized arguments in support of the law. 
Following  we  will  present  the  “index  of  decentralization”  for  both  families  of 
arguments and political parties. Comparing the average “index of decentralization” for the 
five families of arguments used by politicians at the Parliament (see Graph 2 below), we 
observe that family A reaches the higher level: ID (A) =9.73. This happens because most of 
the arguments used by political parties are decentralized-type A (see Graph 1 above), and only 
PP uses centralized-type A arguments. In the same sense, ID (D) =7.99, ID (E) =7.56. In all 
these families the index is near to ten and again only PP is using some centralized arguments 
regarding these families.
[Graph 2 about here]
Results concerning the families of arguments B and C are less relevant, as there are 
only a small number of observations for these families. In any case, families B and C are used 
in a more centralized way, with family C is reaching the lowest index: ID(C) =0.91. The 
reason here is that from a total of eleven arguments of type C, five of them are centralized 
ones, found in the discourses by the Minister of Finance. With respect to family B, also barely 
used by politicians, the index is: ID (B) =4.29. The explanation is that among seven arguments of  type  B  that  we  identify,  only  two  are  centralized  ones  (we  identified  one  centralized 
argument in the discourses by the political party PP and other in ones by CC).
Finally, we calculated the total-average-index of decentralization. This index is 8.54 
(see Graph 2), meaning that generally speaking the families have been used regarding their 
“decentralized side” (“even arguments” of the matrix).
Graph  3  presents  the  comparative  scores  in  the  index  of  decentralization  of  the 
different parties, compounding the information presented in Table 3. The same explanations 
used then apply here, and we can see that parties that exclusively put forward arguments in 
favor of decentralization get the maximum score (10). Parties that present a mix of arguments 
score  lower  in  the  index,  with  PP  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance  scoring  3.8  and  1.02, 
respectively. CC reaches 6.67 because of the few centralized comments it gives supporting the 
law. It is worthy to note that, overall, the general opinion expressed by Spanish politicians on 
the GLBS is in favor of decentralization (a fact reflected by the overall score of 8.54), and 
may be because many parties (with the notable exceptions of PP and Ministry of Finance) fear 
the  law  could  be  too  biased  towards  centralization.  Stabilization  may  not  be  seen  as  an 
opportunity for sub-national governments to be active and responsible, but as a constraint to 
their normal operations.
[Graph 3 about here]
**********
In  what  follows,  the  paper  elaborates  the  information  described  in  Table  3  to 
understand better the results of the indexes and the arguments used by politicians. We start by 
analyzing the political parties by considering the nature of their arguments. 
The Minister of Finance (see Graph 4 below) supports the law in all his discourses, 
using both  centralized (44 percent) and decentralized (56 percent) arguments. Among the centralized arguments, the most important are the Dc arguments (public choice) -18 percent-, 
especially claiming that “citizens receive clearer benefits when the budgetary stability comes 
from the central government” (D5). The other main pillar of the Minister’s defense of the law 
with  decentralized  arguments  is  based  on  legislation  (Ec),  of  the  type  of  “the  national 
Constitution would justify that the central government can require deficit zero in lower levels 
of government”.
Interestingly, when defending the law with decentralized arguments, the Minister of 
Finance uses the same families of arguments. The most frequently used types are Dd (21 
percent of the time) (“a correct national budgetary discipline can be achieved through the 
coordination/cooperation among the central and lower levels of government”) and Ed (19 
percent) (“The central budgetary normative have to respect the former regional and local 
normative, and also the institutions already dealing with budgetary stability in lower levels of 
government”.)
This draws a clear picture of what are the most relevant aspects of the law from the
point of view of the Minister. He focuses on legislation and public choice issues (72 percent 
of  all  arguments  belong  to  these  families)  in  his  defense  of  the  law,  and  he  uses  both 
decentralized  and  centralized  arguments,  considering  the  law  from  all  its  possible 
perspectives.
[Graph 4 about here]
Graph 5 presents the distribution of arguments used by the party in power at the time, 
PP. It is interesting to note that, although PP is of the same political affiliation as the Minister 
of Finance, PP differs from the Minister in the type of arguments (using more decentralized 
arguments in the defense of the law) and the families it uses.When it comes to the families used within the centralized arguments, PP speakers use 
the same type of legislative arguments as the Minister of Finance but different public choice 
arguments. The PP defends the law arguing that, “the only way to reach budgetary discipline 
in lower levels of government is through a national level law”.
Among the decentralized arguments, the most important difference with the Minister 
of Finance is the inclusion of arguments belonging to the A family (budgetary and financing), 
which become the most frequently used arguments, stating that “in a decentralized country, 
any budgetary stability rule has to respect the competencies and the political and budgetary 
autonomy of the low levels of government”.
[Graph 5 about here] 
We identified only 18 arguments in the interventions of CC, the only political party 
making statements in defense of the law, together with the Minister of Finance, PP, and CIU
9. 
In Graph 6 we can see that the distribution of arguments differs from that of other supporters: 
centralized arguments represent only 16 percent of the total. By families, we can see that 11 
percent are of type D, and CC uses B arguments more often than the PP, representing 5 
percent  of  CC’s  interventions.  However,  the  CC  also  sees  issues  with  the  law,  such  as 
concerns  that  the  GLBS  may  not  respect  the  budgetary  and  financing  autonomy  of  sub-
national governments (in fact, 60 percent of the party’s arguments are of type Ad).
[Graph 6 about here] 
 The rest of the political parties discussing the GLBS at the Parliament are against the 
law, claiming that the GLBS tends to centralization. An interesting fact is that the political 
parties for which we identified a high number of arguments (BNG, IU, PNV, PSOE, and 
SNV) distribute their arguments in a very similar way, using almost exclusively Ad, Dd, and 
Ed arguments (except for BNG and IU, which also use Bd arguments). Using Graph 7 we turn now to discuss in more detail the types of arguments used by PSOE, the main opposition party 
at the time.
[Graph 7 about here]
PSOE  was  mostly  concerned  about  the  potential  loss  of  budgetary  and  political 
autonomy of the low levels of government that may result from the GLBS, which is reflected 
in  its  frequent  use  of  arguments  of  family  A,  and  the  lack  of  need  (D2  arguments)  or 
constitutional support (E arguments) for centrally-imposed budgetary discipline.
Graphs 8, 9 and 10 present some interesting information about some region-based 
parties such as ERC, EA and PAN. At first glance, we can see that, compared to parties with 
national scope, region-based parties tend to concentrate their speeches around one particular 
type of argument.
ERC, like the other political parties from the region of Catalonia (CIU, ECP, and IC-
V) presents a majority of Ad arguments, emphasizing that “in a decentralized country, any 
budgetary  stability  rule  has  to  respect  the  competencies  and  the  political  and  budgetary 
autonomy of the low levels of government”). EA concentrates its speeches on Ed arguments, 
noting that “the central budgetary normative have to respect the former regional and local 
normative, and also the institutions already dealing with budgetary stability in lower levels of 
government”. Finally, PAN centers its interventions on public choice arguments (D family), 
insisting  that  “a  correct  national  budgetary  discipline  can  be  achieved  through the 
coordination/cooperation among the central and lower levels of government”.
[Graphs 8, 9, and 10 about here] 6. THE METHODOLOGY IN PERSPECTIVE
This methodology allows the quantification of the politicians’ discourses, making it 
possible to systematically extract and classify the key points of the different parties, applying a 
“matrix of arguments” constructed from a theoretical point of view to the actual interventions 
of  the  political  parties.  Some  may  argue  that  we  can  get  a  general  feeling  for  what  a 
politician’s position on an issue is without having to go through the trouble of applying the 
method used here. However, this argument is flawed for several reasons. We summarize now 
the advantages and the caveats of the methodology applied.
First, a party may express mixed opinions about the law (as is the case for some of the 
parties analyzed here); thus, simplifying its position to “in favor” or “against” would not be 
easy by simply “keeping up with political activity”. Our method allows us to provide some 
sense about the net position of these mixed-views parties.
Second, even if a party was to always declare itself “against” the law, the reasons for 
its doing so may vary widely. In the case studied here, the casual observer may easily realize 
that some parties are strongly against the GLBS. It is however, more difficult to pin-point that 
most of the arguments used against the law are “decentralized” arguments. Also, among the 
seven types of arguments proposed by the theory, politicians who oppose the GLBS are most 
troubled about “budgetary and financing autonomy” (family A), and issues having to do with 
“legislation” (family E), but are virtually unconcerned by “spending on economic services” or 
“general expenditures” (families F and G). 
In particular (see Table 3), we can see that the parties who use arguments both in favor 
and against the law (PP  and CC,  as well as the Minister of Finance) employ five or six 
families  of  arguments.  However,  among  the  12  parties  that  consistently  express  their 
dissatisfaction with the law, most of them (eight) use only three arguments. In  the  distribution  of  families,  all  parties  consider  the  budgetary  and  financing 
autonomy of A.C. and L.C. (from either perspective), and discuss the public choice aspects of 
the law: families A and D. However, only the parties that express some favorable opinions 
about the GLBS (PP, CC and Minister of Finance) consider its incidence on macroeconomic 
stabilization: family C, just with the exceptions of CIU and BNG, with non-favorable opinions 
about the GLBS. 
All things considered, our method allows us to tie the political interventions back to 
the theoretical foundations that researchers use. After the analysis, it becomes clearer what 
kinds of issues are in the minds of policy-makers when dealing with decentralization of public 
finances.
We must also note some caveats in the methodology. First, the method is most useful 
when a large number of different theoretical arguments can be applied to a law or political 
discussion. If the possible theoretical arguments are few or easy to distinguish just reading the 
discourses, the construction of the matrix may be unnecessarily costly. 
Second,  there  is  some  subjectivity  involved  in  our  methodology,  both  translating 
literature into the construction of the matrix and afterwards applying the matrix to reading the 
politicians’ discourses. Nevertheless, as we pointed out before, this caveat could be more 
relevant in the application of the matrix, since the literature constructing the matrix is well 
established. 
Lastly,  the  first  step  of our methodology enables us  to  find 732 arguments of the 
matrix  and  their  distribution  into  families.  In  a  second  step,  it  provides  an  “index  of 
decentralization” for both political parties and families of arguments. The caveat here appears 
if the reader extracts too much quantitative meaning from the scale -10 to 10 of the index. For 
instance, analyzing Graph 3, we find an index of 6.67 for political party CC and of 3.8 for PP, but this does not imply that CC is twice as in favor of decentralization as PP is. Rather, higher 
indexes imply more arguments are used in support of decentralization (10 would mean all 
arguments are in favor of the issue analyzed): the index is ordered rather than cardinal. 
7. CONCLUSIONS
The devolution of responsibilities to lower ties of government is an active process in 
many  countries,  and  political  parties  are  essential  players  in  this  process.  However,  the 
politicians’ speeches and interventions (which are the public expression of their points of 
view and intended policies) are hardly considered in analyzing decentralization.
The  method  manages  to  achieve  equilibrium  between  enough  detail  to  provide 
significant insights, and enough aggregation to maintain an overall vision (and not spreading 
data too thinly). It allows condensing lengthy, complicated political interventions into a set of 
indexes that are consistently produced and theoretically based.
The  methodological  contribution  of  the  paper  is  twofold.  We  first  discuss  the 
construction  of  a  matrix  for  the  analysis  of  laws  dealing  with  decentralization  of  public 
finances, and we then go on to construct a series of indexes to characterize political discourses 
on the matter. The process of construction of matrix (and its families) is derived directly from 
the theory of fiscal federalism, and provides the guide for the classification of the politicians’ 
statements. The index of decentralization represents, to our knowledge, the first attempt in the 
literature  of  fiscal  federalism  to  create  a  method  that  makes  it  possible  to  quantify  the 
practitioners’ point of view on a piece of legislation. The index makes use of the classification 
of arguments constructed for the elaboration of the matrix, but goes beyond the information 
presented there, because it reduces the information from the speeches to a more systematic 
tool.  The application of the method discussed here can provide useful information for policy 
makers. Because policymaking is a dynamic process, it is important to know not only 
whether a law has the approval of politicians, but also why.  Moreover, we would like 
to know the reasons that create dissension among policy makers. Laws are debated, 
redrafted, and compromises are made in the process. Sometimes what is perceived as a 
stumbling stone may not be of capital importance for some political groups, while 
other aspects of the law are key. The index makes it possible to separate the two from a 
theoretical point of view.  We consider in this paper the analysis of a particular case
(the GLBS, a law of capital importance for decentralized public finances in Spain), but 
this methodology can be applied to the study of other issues where the translation of 
political discourses on decentralization into a metric may be useful.
The methodology employed here provides some interesting additional insights. For 
example, it allows us to identify which types of arguments are used in the discourse and their 
intensity for each party. By simply reading the discourses we might gather that there is strong 
opposition to the GLBS, and at this juncture, it could be argued that opposition parties show 
their antagonism to the governing party (PP) by attacking any law proposal, regardless of its 
intrinsic quality. This means that the grade of “attachment” to the decentralization process 
does not entirely correspond to their manifested position. However, the use of the matrix and 
indexes allows us to provide a more detailed picture, and we show that in fact, ideological 
differences exist under the apparent unanimity of these parties. 
In short, we believe that the method described here could provide notable insights for 
the many  countries where decentralization is  an ongoing process, and further work could 
adapt it to other countries and issues.ANNEXES
Annex 1: Summary of some of the key principles of the GLBS.
1. Principle of Budgetary Stability. The elaboration, approval and execution of the 
budgets for all levels of government will be performed according to a frame of budgetary 
stability,  taking  into  account  the  guiding  principles  of  the  SGP.  When  talking  about 
“budgetary stability” we refer to the situation of balance or surplus of the budget (summary of 
articles 2 and 3 of the GLBS). 
2. Principle of multi-annual finance plan. The elaboration of budgets by the different 
levels of government will be framed within a multi-annual set-up. This framework will be 
compatible  with  the  yearly  principle  guiding  the  approval  and  execution  of  the  budgets 
(Budgetary General Law) and with the temporal horizon of four years advised by the SGP 
(summary of article 4 of the GLBS).
3.  Principle  of Transparency.  The  GLBS  pretends  that  all  agents  running  the 
budgetary process always have to be able to know the situation of the public finances and to 
verify the fulfillment of the budgetary stability objectives (summary of article 5 of the GLBS).
4. Principle of Efficiency regarding the allocation and use of the public resources. 
The GLBS leads to efficiency, efficacy and quality in management of resources (summary of 
article 6 of the GLBS).
Annex 2: The documents used in analyzing the GLBS.
•  At  the  Congress: plenary  sessions  (numbers  1  through 3),  special commissions 
(number 4), and amendment proposals (numbers 5 and 10).• At the Senate: plenary session (number 6), commissions (number 7), amendment 
proposals (numbers 9 and 12), and vetoes to the GLBS (numbers 8 and 11).
• Exposition of motives of the GLBS (and its complementary law) by the central 
government -Partido Popular-  (number 13).
List of the specific documents analyzed:
1. Congreso de los Diputados (Congress of Deputies), Pleno (General Session), n. 
066, March 8, 2001.
2. Congreso de los Diputados (Congress of Deputies), Pleno (General Session), n. 
111, October 4, 2001. 
3. Congreso de los Diputados (Congress of Deputies), Pleno (General Session), n. 
125, November 29, 2001.
4. Congreso de los Diputados (Congress of Deputies), Comisiones (Commissions), n. 
291, September 18, 2001.
5.  Enmiendas  (Amendments):  “BOCG.  Congreso  de  los  Diputados  (Congress  of 
Deputies)”, serie A, n. 29-19, June 14, 2001.
6. Senado (Senate), Pleno (General Session), n. 67, November 22, 2001.
7. Senado (Senate), Comisiones (Commissions), n. 199, November 12, 2001. 
8. Propuestas de veto, Senado (Veto proposals, Senate): BOCG. Senado, serie II, n. 
33-c, November 2, 2001.
9.  Enmiendas,  Senado  (Amendments,  Senate):  BOCG.  Senado,  serie  II,  n.  33-d, 
November 2, 2001.
10. Enmiendas (Amendments): “BOCG. Congreso de los Diputados (Congress of 
Deputies)”,  serie  A,  n.  30-18,  June  14,  2001  (special  amendments  referring  to  the 
Complementary Law of the General Law of Budgetary Stability).
11. Propuestas de veto, Senado (Veto proposals, Senate): BOCG. Senado, serie II, n. 
34-c,  November  2,  2001  (special  proposals  referring  to  the  Complementary  Law  of  the 
General Law of Budgetary Stability).
12. Enmiendas, Senado (Amendments, Senate): BOCG. Senado, serie II, n. 34-d, 
November 2, 2001 (special amendments referring to the Complementary Law of the General 
Law of Budgetary Stability).
13.  Exposición de motivos (as an introduction) of the General Law of Budgetary 
Stability and its Complementary Law.TABLES
Table 1: Matrix of decentralization: families and arguments within each family.




A2- In a decentralized country, any budgetary 
stability rule has to respect the competencies 
and the political and budgetary autonomy of 
the lower levels of government.
A1- There  is  no  direct  relationship  between 
public investment and deficit in the middle and 
long  term.  This  implies  that  the  central 
government can regulate deficit for all levels of 
government  without  influencing  public 
investments  at  lower  levels  of  government. 
(González-Páramo, 2001).
A4- Regional  and  local  governments  need 
deficits  in  order  to  finance  their  public 
investment more frequently. Hence, a national 
regulation trying to prevent deficits does not 




spending on social 
issues
B1- The  central  level  of  government  has  to 
control  deficit  in  the  lower  levels,  because a 
government  without  deficit  favors  all 
generations. 
B2- Regional  and  local  governments  have 
their own responsibility with respect to their 
future generations. In this sense, some deficit 
could  exist  in  order  to  share  responsibilities 
between generations. 
B3- “According to the fiscal federalism theory, 
central  governments  could  have  primary 
responsibility on the function of redistribution” 
(Oates, 1999).
B4- Central  governments  could  redistribute 
rent  among  jurisdictions,  but  only  regional 
and  local  governments  will  be  able  to 
redistribute rent among individuals (Melguizo 
Sánchez, 1989).
B5- Redistribution  at  lower  levels  of 
government  could  cause  fiscal  migrations 
among different regions. Central governments 
are then better fit to carry out this function. 
B6- Regional  and  local  governments  could 
better  handle  redistribution,  because there  is 
no  a  direct  relationship  between  fiscal 
migrations and redistribution.
B7- The central government should carry out 
spending  on  education  and  medical  care 
research programs, taking into account reasons 
like:  economies  of  scale,  externalities, 
technology  uniformity,  and  the  jurisdictional 
area of benefices (Braña Pino and Serna de los 
Mozos, 1999).
B8-  The  political  requirements  and  the 
proximity to citizens would justify that lower 
levels  of  government  carry  out  the  general 
administration of education and medical care 
programs  within  their  jurisdictions  (Braña 
Pino and Serna de los Mozos, 1999).
B9- Spending  on  retirement  and 
unemployment  pensions  should  be  in  the 
central  government’s  hands,  because they are 
social  assistance  policies  with  national 
repercussion.
B10- The  principle  of  “fiscal  equivalence” 
(Olson, 1969) would justify that lower levels 





C1- “According to the fiscal federalism theory, 
central  governments  could  have  primary 
responsibility on the function of stabilization” 
(Oates,  1999)  and,  therefore,  on  budgetary 
stability.
C2- Lower levels of government could have 
responsibility  on  budgetary  stability.  They 
know better their own macroeconomic reality 
and  how  to  manage  their  budget  as  an 
instrument of stability.C4- Any national budgetary discipline has to 
count  on  regional  and  local  governments, 
since  budgetary  discipline  has  consequences 
regarding low levels of government: temporal 




D1-  The  only  way  to  reach  budgetary 
discipline  in  lower  levels  of  government  is 
through a national law.
D2- In decentralized countries, lower levels of 
government  can  handle  their  own  budgetary 
discipline. They do not need any imposed law 
coming  from  the  central  level  (Eichengreen 
and Von Hagen, 1996).
D3- A  national  law  of  budgetary  discipline 
increases  the  prestige  and  credibility  of  the 
central government.
D4- A  national  law  of  fiscal  discipline 
imposes an excessive and unnecessary rigidity 
on regional and local governments, adversely 
affecting  governors  running  these 
jurisdictions. 
D5- Citizens receive clearer benefits when the 
budgetary  stability  comes  from  the  central 
government. 
D6- The  budgetary behavior of regional and 
local  governments  is  more  important  for 
citizens.
D7-  All levels of government have to follow 
the  example  of  the  central  government 
concerning budgetary stability.
D8- Regional  and  local  governments  do  not 
need the example of the central government. 
They  can  attain  enough  budgetary discipline 
and therefore support the budgetary stability at 
national level unaided. 
D10- Appropriate  national  budgetary 
discipline  can  be  achieved  through  the 
coordination / cooperation of the central and 
the  lower  levels  of  government,  without 
imposition from the top.
Family E
Legislation
E1-  The  national  Constitution  would  justify 
that the central government can require deficit 
zero in lower levels of government.
E2- There is not enough constitutional support 
for  the  central  government  to  impose 
budgetary  stability  for  all  levels  of 
government. 
E4- The  central  budgetary  normative  has  to 
respect  the  former  regional  and  local 
normative,  and  also  the  institutions  already 
dealing  with  budgetary  stability  in  lower 
levels of government.
E3-  The  central  government  has  the  right  to 
bond budgets of all levels of government to the 
agreements of the “Stability and Growth Pact” 
(SGP), established among EU countries in July 
1997.
E6- The  budgetary  stability  imposed  by  the 
central  government  exceeds  the  SGP 





F1- Because of the existence of externalities, 
the central government can play a major role 
regulating issues such as communications, the 
environment,  agriculture,  transportation, 
capital markets, and national and international 
trade. (Boadway and Shah, 1995
F2- However, based on the jurisdictional area 
of  benefits  and  the  requirements  of regional 
policies,  some  issues  like  communications, 
transportation,  tourism,  agriculture, 
stockbreeding,  and  fishing  could  be  carried 
out by regional and local governments (Braña 




G1-  There are general services that could  be 
better provided at the central level because of 
their  benefits  are  national:  external  issues, 
defense, general administration, or immigration 
(Boadway and Shah, 1995).G2- Lower levels of government could carry 
out spending on civil protection, public order 
and security. Their area of jurisdiction would 
justify this position.
Source: Own elaboration from: Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), Braña Pino and Serna de los Mozos (1999), 
Boadway and Shah (1995), Eichengreen and Von Hagen (1996), González-Páramo (2001), Melguizo Sánchez 
(1989), Molero (2001, 2002), Oates (1999), Olson (1969).









Degree of intensity 




BNG 103.7 56.5 54.5
CC 39.8 18 45.2
CHA 1 8.5 850.0
CIU 65.7 55 83.7
EA 7.7 13 168.8
ECP 29.4 31.5 107.1
ERC 12.5 32 256.0
Min.Fin. 28.15 49 174.1
PP 74.7 92 123.2
IC-V 19.5 33 169.2
IU 92.2 74.5 80.8
PAN 26.2 39 148.9
PNV 56.1 95.5 170.2
PSOE 64.6 69 106.8




























BNG 0 24 0 1 0 4 0 11 0 16.5
CC 0 10.5 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 2.5
CHA 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 2
CIU 0 37.5 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 11.5
EA 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5
ECP 0 19.5 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 8
ERC 0 26 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 1
Min.Fin. 1 8 0 0 5 0 9 10 7 9
PP 3.5 32.5 1 0 0 0 6 16 18 15
IC-V 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 10
IU 0 44 0 2 0 0 0 12 0 16.5
PAN 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 16.5 0 6.5
PNV 0 37 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 33.5
PSOE 0 25.5 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 21.5
SNV 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 21.5
Distribution 




4.5 335.5 2 5 5 6 17 152 25 180
Source: Own elaboration from table 1 and Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales (BOCG), year 2001.GRAPHS
*Note: “d” indicates decentralized arguments, “c.” indicates centralized arguments. For instance: Ad. are 
decentralized arguments in family Ac are centralized arguments in family A.
Source: Own elaboration from table 1 and Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales (BOCG), year 2001.
Source: Own elaboration.




































Note: where “c” indicates centralized arguments, and “d” decentralized arguments.
Source: table 3




































Graph 4: Families of arguments used by the Minister of 














2%Note: where “c” indicates centralized arguments, and “d” decentralized arguments.
Source: table 3
Note: where “c” indicates centralized arguments, and “d” decentralized arguments.
Source: table 3
Graph 5: Families of arguments used by the political 















Graph 6: Families of arguments used by the political 












11%Note: where “c” indicates centralized arguments, and “d” decentralized arguments.
Source: table 3
Note: where “c” indicates centralized arguments, and “d” decentralized arguments.
Source: table 3
Graph 7: Families of arguments used by the political 







Graph 8: Families of arguments used by the political 








82%Note: where “c” indicates centralized arguments, and “d” decentralized arguments.
Source: table 3
Note: where “c” indicates centralized arguments, and “d” decentralized arguments.
Source: table 3
                                                
Graph 9: Families of arguments used by the political 







Graph 10: Families of arguments used by the political 
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NOTES
1 1984 is the first year in which all the regional governments had a budget for the entire period.
2 Although, as we will explain later on, this law has a complementary one. We will refer to both laws 
without distinguishing between the two using the general reference “GLBS”.
3  Since the GLBS was approved in December 2001, its application began in January 2002 for the 
elaboration of the budget for 2003. 
4 For more information concerning public spending decentralization see for instance Molero (2001), and 
Gil- Ruiz, Gil-Esparza, and Iglesias Quintana (2007).
5 As we pointed out before, we will refer to both laws using the term “GLBS”.
6 We include here politicians intervening in the different discourses by last name and political affiliation. 
BNG:  Aymerich  Cano,  Quintana  González  and  Rodríguez  Sánchez.  CC:  Julio  Reyes,  Mauricio  Rodríguez, 
Morales Rodríguez and Ríos Pérez. CHA: Labordeta Subías. CIU: Cambra I Sánchez, Marimon I Sabaté, Padrol 
I Munté, Trias I Vidal De Llobatera. EA: De Boneta y Piedra and Lasagabaster Olazábal. ECP: Aleu I Jornet and 
Aroz Ibáñez. ERC: Puigcercós I Boixassa. GOB-HAC: Montoro Romero. IC-V: Saura Laporta. IU: Cabrero 
Palomares,  Cámara  Fernández,  Llamazares  Trigo  and  Rejón  Gieb.  PAN:  Núñez  Castain.  PNV:  Anasagasti 
Olabeaga  and  Azpiazu  Uriarte.  PP:  Cámara  Rodríguez-Valenzuela,  Caneda  Morales,  De  Grandes  Pascual, 
González  Pons  and  Soto  García,  PSOE:  Caldera  Sánchez-Capitán,  Fernández  de  la  Vega  Sanz,  Fernández 
Marugán, Lerma Blasco, Martínez García, Mendizabal Gorostiaga and Sevilla Segura. SNV: Albistur Marín.
7 As we explain in the methodology section, the “units of extension” can be decimal numbers, because, 
for instance, one could find interventions of 2.5 columns. Amendment proposals are always integer numbers.
8 Logically, we identified more than once each argument, because the matrix only has 34 arguments. 
9 Although the political party CIU voted in favor of the law, we did not identify centralized arguments in 
its discourses, just decentralized ones.                                                                                                                                                        
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